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A growing empirical literature has found that neighborhood heterogeneity lowers people‟s 
likelihood of contributing to public goods, but has struggled to address the issues raised by 
definition of neighborhood size or endogenous neighborhood location.  We show that the 
estimated effect of concave neighborhood characteristics like heterogeneity on outcomes of 
interest may be biased if boundaries are defined too broadly, or underestimated if they are 
defined too narrowly.  We also argue that fixed effects panels that follow neighborhoods over 
time may address problems of endogenous self-selection between neighborhoods if sorting 
takes place in the manner of the Tiebout hypothesis.  We apply both points using three rounds 
of New Zealand census data to test whether volunteering rates are lowered by neighborhood 
heterogeneity by race/ethnicity, birthplace, income or language.  We find boundaries matter, 
and that only ethnic/racial heterogeneity is robustly associated with lower volunteering. 
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1.  Introduction   
  Do individuals in communities that become more heterogeneous lose concern for the 
welfare of others?   Support for this provocative claim has emerged in the past decade over 
various dimensions of “heterogeneity” and manifestations of “concern for others.”  To 
address this question empirically, researchers have commonly tested for an effect of a 
concave neighborhood characteristic (heterogeneity), on people‟s propensity to give time or 
money to public goods, become members of organizations, return census forms, express trust 
in others, and so on.  More generally, researchers have used a similar approach to test for the 
effect of various concave neighborhood characteristics on various outcomes of interest.  
Examples include the effect of neighborhood income inequality on mortality rates (Lynch et 
al. 1998, Mellor and Milyo 2001, Deaton and Lubotsky 2003, Lochner et al. 2001), self 
reported health (Blakely et al. 2002, Mellor and Milyo 2002), and homicide rates (Mellor and 
Milyo 2001), or the effect of neighborhood racial diversity on population and economic 
growth (Rappaport 1999, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005), and adolescent sexual activity 
(Brewster 1994).
1    
  In this paper we make two contributions.  By using unusually fine geographical units and 
a panel of those units, we address two potential problems in previous studies: neighborhood 
size and endogenous neighborhood choice.  Endogenous neighborhood choice may be 
characterized by a Tiebout-style hypothesis, where people self-select to live in areas with 
others who share their preferences regarding the optimal trade-off between private 
consumption and public goods provision (Tiebout 1956). Thus, if people who are less 
inclined to volunteer are attracted to locate in urban centres, which tend to be more 
heterogeneous, then the literature‟s estimated cross sectional effects of heterogeneity on 
volunteering may be exaggerated. Similarly, the size of neighborhood used to estimate the 
effect of a concave characteristic (like heterogeneity) on people‟s behavior may introduce 
bias if it is defined too broadly.  This is because larger unit analysis is likely to incorrectly 
capture the effect of differences between constituent smaller units due to the concavity of the 
heterogeneity measure.  In contrast, if the size of neighborhood is defined too narrowly to 
                                                       
1   There is a larger empirical literature testing for the effect of non-linear (but not necessarily 
concave) neighborhood characteristics on various outcomes, covering a wider range of 
applications (for surveys, see Deaton (2003) or Durlauf (2004)).  While neighborhood 
boundary choice may affect results for all non-linear measures, we have focused here on the 
consequence of using concave neighborhood measures in particular.                               
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include the effects of heterogeneity in adjacent areas, the lower bound of heterogeneity‟s total 
effect can still be estimated.  We address both endogenous location and size effects to further 
the empirical investigation of the effects of neighborhood heterogeneity on people‟s 
contribution of time to public goods, or volunteering.  We use a heretofore untapped data 
source that provides several advantages over preceding studies: New Zealand census data on 
volunteering rates at the unusually fine levels of “meshblock” (= 100 people) and “area unit” 
(= 2000 people) for 1996, 2001 and 2006.  We test whether heterogeneity of ethnicity/race, 
languages spoken, birthplace, or household income affects New Zealander‟s likelihood of 
volunteering.  Questions regarding volunteering were asked of all New Zealanders in 1996, 
2001 and 2006, enabling us to construct both pooled cross section and neighborhood fixed 
effects regressions for the entire country.  The New Zealand census releases an unusually 
comprehensive list of covariates for all three years, allowing our cross section regressions to 
better control for confounding neighborhood characteristics such as deprivation, crime, 
housing and employment status, that may be correlated with heterogeneity. By using two 
levels of neighborhood boundary, we address the sensitivity of our empirical findings to 
neighborhood size and the robustness of previous studies using broader units. Our fixed 
effects regressions, following neighborhoods over time, can go part way to addressing 
residual endogeneity in our cross section analysis, based on a Tiebout–style argument that 
unobserved attitudes towards volunteering may remain stable within neighborhoods over time 
even as the people in them come and go.  
  The rest of the paper will proceed as follows.  In Section 2, we review the growing 
empirical literature investigating the effect of neighborhood diversity on public good 
contributions and trust.  In Section 3, we present a simple model that highlights the 
importance of neighborhood size when estimating the effects of concave neighborhood 
characteristics on outcomes of interest.  In Section 4 we present descriptive statistics 
regarding volunteering and various measures of heterogeneity in New Zealand, followed by 
our estimation methods and results.  In Section 5 we provide a discussion and conclusions. 
 
2.  Diversity, public goods and trust 
  In recent years researchers have examined the effects of increased neighborhood 
heterogeneity by race, ethnicity, education, income or first language, on an individual‟s 
propensity to volunteer, contribute to fundraisers, be a member of any organization, trust                               
3 
 
others or support welfare programs.
2 While the bulk of empirical studies have been carried 
out using data from the United States, others have used surveys from Australia, Kenya, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (see below).  The most common approach has been to 
regress individuals‟ survey responses on individual and neighborhood level characteristics, 
with the latter separately taken from census data for the neighborhood or region in which the 
respondents live. 
  A selective summary of this literature might suggest that there is indeed a robust 
negative relationship between heterogeneity and support for public goods and trust in others. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002), using pooled cross sectional data from multiple years of 
the U.S. General Social Survey, find that increased neighborhood heterogeneity of income or 
race lowers an individual‟s probability of reporting membership in any organization, or of 
agreeing that “most people can be trusted.”   Costa and Kahn (2003a), using pooled cross 
section data from two years of the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), find that increased 
heterogeneity of income or birthplace lowers an individual‟s probability of membership in 
any organization or of volunteering.  Costa and Kahn (2003b) using the CPS and the DDB 
Lifestyle Survey, find that increased racial heterogeneity lowers individuals‟ probability of 
volunteering.  Vigdor (2004) finds that U.S. census tracts that were more heterogeneous in 
race, age or educational attainment in 2000 had lower response rates of households mailing in 
completed census forms.  Returning such forms can be seen as a local public good, because 
local public funding depends on enumerated census tract population.  Putnam (2007), using 
responses from the U.S. Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey of 2000, finds that 
individuals in more racially heterogeneous census tracts were less likely to give to charity or 
volunteer, trust others (whether of their own or other races), register to vote, or be optimistic 
that others would cooperate in dilemmas of collective action.  Finally, Luttmer (2001), again 
using pooled cross section data from multiple years of the General Social Survey, finds that 
support for government welfare spending is lower in more racially heterogeneous states, and 
that this effect is significant in explaining some of the variation in generosity of welfare 
across states.    
                                                       
2  Political scientists such as Robert Putnam (2007) have emphasized the effects of 
heterogeneity on “social capital”, or peoples‟ beliefs and actions that contribute to “social 
networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.” 
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  While the bulk of the adverse findings regarding heterogeneity have come from the 
United States, a limited number of papers have found similar results elsewhere, particularly 
related to trust.  Leigh (2006), using the 1997/98 Australian Community Survey and 1996 
Australian census data, finds that increased neighborhood heterogeneity of country of birth or 
of language spoken at home lowers the probability of individuals trusting their neighbors.  
Letki (2008), using data from the British Home Office Citizenship Survey of 2001 and 
census, finds that increased ward level racial heterogeneity lowers individuals‟ trust in their 
neighbors.  Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008), using the 1994 and 1998 Swedish Election 
Studies Panel and county level census data, find that increased income inequality in the lower 
half of the income distribution, or in the proportion of a respondent‟s county that is foreign 
born, lowered reported trust in others.  Finally, Miguel and Gugerty (2005), using an NGO-
funded survey of schools in rural Kenya, find that local ethnic heterogeneity is associated 
with sharply lower voluntary school fundraiser contributions, resulting in lower quality 
primary schools.   
  Theoretically, the negative effects of heterogeneity on people‟s trust of others or 
contributions to public goods has been attributed to their innate preference to interact with 
others like themselves, which can cause social networks and the trust they generate to atrophy 
as dissimilarities increase (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, 2002, Putman 2007).  People may be 
less likely to “internalize” the benefits they bestow on the community at large by contributing 
to public goods if they perceive less similarity between themselves and that community 
(Vigdor 2004).  Linguistic heterogeneity in particular may increase the costs of 
communication and reduce of quality of information exchanged in networks, making 
investments in such networks less attractive (Leigh 2006).   Ethnic or cultural heterogeneity 
may also reduce the ability of communities to impose negative social sanctions for free riding 
across ethnic lines (Miguel and Gugerty 2005).   Some have tried to organize these various 
causal mechanisms via preferences, strategies, and production (Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005), Habyarimana et al. (2007).       
  While the above (selective) summary might suggest conclusive evidence that 
heterogeneity corrodes people‟s trust in others and their contributions towards public goods, a 
closer inspection of this literature show the results to be less robust, and more problematic 
than they first appear.   
Regarding robustness, papers testing for the effects of different kinds of heterogeneity 
often find that some kinds matter, but others do not, or that multiple kinds may matter when                               
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tested individually, but not when tested jointly.  And the type of heterogeneity that affects 
behavior or trust seems to vary from study to study.   For example, Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2002) find that higher neighborhood racial heterogeneity (white, black, Asian etc) lowered 
trust in other people, but higher heterogeneity of ethnic origin did not, while higher income 
inequality lowered trust when racial heterogeneity was excluded, but had no significant effect 
when it was included.  Similarly, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that while income, racial 
and ethnic heterogeneity all lowered the probability of group membership when entered 
separately, only income heterogeneity mattered when all three measures were included 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).  And while Letki (2008) finds that higher racial heterogeneity 
lowers trust in the United Kingdom, it has no effect on people‟s likelihood of formal or 
informal volunteering, unlike in the United States (Putnam (2007) and Costa and Kahn 
(2003b)).  Again, while higher birthplace heterogeneity lowers trust in others in Sweden or 
Australia (Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008, Leigh 2006), higher ethnic heterogeneity (i.e. 
birthplace of ancestors) in Sweden does not. 
  Regarding problems, many of the studies on heterogeneity have been based on cross 
sectional data (Putnam 2007, Alesina et al. 1999, Letki 2008, Leigh (2006), Vigdor (2004), 
Miguel and Gugerty 2005).  They thus cannot be sure that effects attributed to heterogeneity 
are not instead caused by omitted variables that are correlated with heterogeneity.  Letki 
(2008) in particular argues that neighborhood deprivation, poverty and crime may correlate 
with ethnic diversity yet be inadequately captured is many preceding studies, making 
diversity wrongly appear responsible for social withdrawal.  Cross sectional studies also 
cannot determine whether it is the level of heterogeneity or changes in the level of 
heterogeneity that is affecting people‟s behavior.
3   
There remains a problem, however, which heterogeneity studies have not generally 
recognized: how is the (often constrained) choice of neighborhood size affecting results?  The 
coarseness of neighborhoods used has varied enormously.  Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) 
use Swedish counties, which contains 200,000 – 300,000 or even over one million people.  
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002), Costa and Kahn (2003a) and Luttmer (2001) use a 
                                                       
3   Luttmer (2001), Costa and Kahn (2003a, 2003b), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002),  
construct pseudo panels of cross sectional survey data, which rely for legitimacy on the 
representativeness of each wave of the survey.  Poterba (1997) uses panel data at the state 
level.  Of the papers we have identified, only Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) use true panel 
data at the individual level, using survey data.                                 
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respondent‟s US Metropolitan or Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA/PMSA), which 
contain a urban core of at least 50,000 and surrounding suburbs and affiliated towns.  Letki 
uses the U.K census level of ward, which contain anywhere from hundreds to over 30,000 
people.  Alesina et al. (1999) uses U.S. county.  Leigh (2006) uses the Australian postal area, 
typically containing 20,000 people.  Since heterogeneity of income, race etc. can vary 
dramatically in just a few city blocks, the heterogeneity people experience most intimately 
may vary widely between areas of these coarsely defined neighborhoods.  At the smaller end, 
Vigdor (2004) and Putnam (2007) define neighborhood at the U.S. census tract level, which 
commonly involves three to five thousand people.   We turn next to a simple model to 
illustrate why the boundary of neighborhood used in these studies matters.  The issue of 
endogenous neighborhood choice is addressed subsequently in Section 4.3. 
 
3. Who are the people in your neighborhood? A model 
In this section, we present a simple model that illustrates the problems that can arise 
when researchers use overly broad or narrow neighborhood boundaries when estimating the 
effect of a concave neighborhood characteristic (e.g. heterogeneity) on an outcome of interest 
(e.g. volunteering).  Consider a society with heterogeneity defined in terms of ethnicity, and 
assume for simplicity that there are only ethnicities 1 and 2.  Assume next that the society can 
be divided into a number of “small” neighborhoods, each of equal size.  We will start by 
assuming that people‟s likelihood of volunteering is affected only by the heterogeneity they 
perceive in their immediate small neighborhood, and relax this assumption later.  Each small 
neighborhood i can then be defined as one of n constituent parts of a “large” neighborhood j.  
Following the literature already cited, we shall assume that ethnic heterogeneity can be 
correctly captured using a fragmentation index, though our argument holds for any concave 
measure.
4  Ethnic fragmentation xij can be constructed for each small neighborhood i within 
large neighborhood j, and expressed as the product of the two ethnicities‟ shares:  
 
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 [1 ] [1 (1 ) ] 2 (1 ) ij ij ij ij ij ij ij x                .                  (1) 
                                                       
4   Other concave measures used in studies of neighborhood effects include the Gini 
coefficient, Theil entropy index, Atkinson deprivation index, coefficient of variation, or 
neighborhood entropy index (see Hansmann and Quigley 1982).  We have repeated the 
empirical analysis reported in this paper using entropy in particular, and found very similar 
results to those that follow.                                 
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Here  1 ij ij    is ethnicity 1‟s share of the population in small neighborhood i of large 
neighborhood j.  With just two ethnicities, the fragmentation index reaches its maximum 
value at 0.5 ij   .  In the same way, we can also construct a fragmentation index xj for the 
large neighborhood.  This will be the product of the two ethnicity‟s shares in the large 
neighborhood, but can be equivalently expressed as each ethnicity‟s average share over the n 
constituent small neighborhoods. 
 
2 2 2 2













 is ethnicity 1‟s share in large neighborhood j.  From the (strict) 
concavity of xij and xj in (1) and (2), it follows from Jensen‟s inequality that the fragmentation 
of the large neighborhood will be (strictly) greater than the mean fragmentation of the n 
constituent small neighborhoods, or   
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) . ij ij ij j j E x E f f E f x                                               (3) 
That is, as long as fragmentation varies across small neighborhoods, heterogeneity will 
appear greater, the larger the neighborhood over which it is defined.  Intuitively, total 
fragmentation in a large neighborhood comes from heterogeneity within each of its small 
neighborhoods, but also from differences in heterogeneity between them.  More formally, we 
define “between” heterogeneity
B
j x  as the residual difference between the fragmentation index 
of large neighborhood j, and the average fragmentation index of its i = 1,…,n constituent 
small neighborhoods, the latter equivalent to “within” heterogeneity
W






j j ij j j j n x x E x x x x

      .                                      (4) 
This mathematical discrepancy may have an empirical consequence: a study that uses large 
neighborhood boundaries may bias the relationship it finds between heterogeneity (or indeed, 
any concave neighborhood characteristic) and people‟s behavior. 
   To see this, consider a benchmark regression model that correctly recognizes that 
changes in small neighborhood heterogeneity xij can affect small neighborhood volunteering 
rates  ij y directly, or indirectly via the effects on heterogeneity between small neighborhoods 
B
j x :  
B
ij W ij B j ij y x x u        .                                            (5)                               
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Here  W   and  B  are the population regression coefficients of within and between 
neighborhood heterogeneity, respectively, and  ij u is a pure random error.  Compare to this an 
empirical study that uses only small neighborhood boundaries, and regresses  ij y  on  ij x alone, 
yielding a population regression coefficient . S   From comparison with (5),  S   may be 
thought of as a biased estimate of the within effect of heterogeneity, W  because of the 
omission of
B
j x .  Using a standard result from omitted variable bias, 









    .                       (6)     
If heterogeneity between small neighborhoods has no effect on volunteering within small 
neighborhoods, or 0 B   , the total effect of heterogeneity will come from the within effect, 
and be captured by S  without bias.  More generally, if between heterogeneity does affect 
volunteering, the total (within and between) effect will still be captured by S  without bias.  
To see this, note that a change in  ij y  caused by a unit change in heterogeneity ij x is the sum of 
the (direct) within effect,  , W ij x    and the (indirect) between effect,  ( ) .
B
B j ij ij x x x     The 
total effect on ij y  is thus ( ( ))
B
W B j ij ij x x x       or ( ( ( , ) ( )))
B
W B ij j ij ij cov x x var x x   . 
From (6), the latter can be re-expressed as  . S ij x           
  In contrast, empirical studies that use only large neighborhood boundaries, and regress yj 
on xj, will have problems.  Returning to our benchmark, a simple aggregation over the correct 






j W j B j j n y x x u   

       .                    (7) 
By adding and subtracting a common term, (7) can be re-expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
W B B
j W j j B W j j
B
W j B W j j
y x x x u
x x u
   
   
     
    
                  (8) 
From comparison with (8), we can see that a study using only large boundaries is missing a 
term involving
B
j x .  The resulting estimated effect of large neighborhood heterogeneity xj on 











       .                        (9)                               
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In the special case that between heterogeneity has no economic effect on volunteering 
( 0 B   ),  L   will not capture the true effect of within heterogeneity.  Instead, if cov( , )
B
jj xx< 
0 then from (9) it follows that  LW   , or ifcov( , )
B
jj xx > 0 then  LW   .  The 
concavity of the heterogeneity measure introduces a sort of measurement error into large 
boundary regressions. More generally, when 0 B   , large boundary regressions will 
continue to provide biased estimates of the within- and total effects of heterogeneity.
5   
  Problems of a different sort arise if boundaries are set too narrowly.  To see this, we 
relax the assumption that people‟s likelihood of volunteering is affected only by the 
heterogeneity they perceive in their immediate small neighborhood.
 6  More formally, rather 
than assuming that ij y can be affected only directly by  ij x   and indirectly by 
B
j x  , we allow 
that it can also be affected by  , ij x i i    .  In this case the total effect on ij y  would be the 
combined one of ( ( ))
B
W B j ij ij x x x       plus the effect of  , ij x i i    . As a result, small 
boundary regressions will themselves yield downward biased estimates 
(( ( ))
B
W B j ij ij x x x      = S ij x   ) of heterogeneity‟s total effect.   Unfortunately, bad news 
for overly-small boundary regressions does not translate into good news for larger boundary 
regressions.   L   will become favorable in the sense of better capturing this additional effect 
of within heterogeneity from surrounding small neighborhoods  , ij x i i    on ij y , but it will 
still be biased because of the omission of a term involving 
B
j x  as in equations (8) and (9).  
For example, in the special case that between heterogeneity has no economic effect on 
volunteering ( 0), B   L  will remain biased in capturing the within effect of  ij x  for all i 
small neighborhoods on  ij y . 
                                                       
5 In the special case that volunteering is identically affected by within and between 
heterogeneity, or WB   , equations (5) and (7) produce  S L W     and  WB   . It is 
only in this case that neighborhood size has no effect on the estimated effect of a concave 
characteristic. 
6 The possibility of heterogeneity outside a small boundary affecting behavior within it also 
needs to be addressed when we consider endogenous neighborhood choice.  We attempt to 
control for endogenous selection to small or large neighborhood boundaries in Section 4.3. 
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Our argument might suggest that researchers should estimate concave neighborhood 
effects using the smallest possible neighborhood size consistent with fully capturing posited 
effects on outcomes of interest.  But researchers are often constrained as to available 
neighborhood size, or else unsure ex ante as to which boundary is just large enough to 
capture all posited influences.  In an additional attempt to capture the within effect of 
heterogeneity on volunteering, as well as the between- and possible adjacent neighborhood 
within effects, we will use two boundary levels simultaneously. We will regress small 
neighborhood volunteering on small and associated large neighborhood heterogeneity 
measures.  With the within effect of small neighborhood heterogeneity on volunteering 
controlled for, the remaining effect of large neighborhood heterogeneity will be equivalent to 
the sum of between effects and additional within effects of  , ij x i i    .  This “hybrid” 
regression allows us to capture the within and between effects of heterogeneity on 
volunteering without the measurement error introduced by the concavity of our fragmentation 
index.  We will also present the results of purely small neighborhood specifications to 
provide a lower bound on heterogeneity‟s total effect, and the results of purely large 
specifications to see if the bias we identify in theory makes much difference in practice. By 
further adding fixed effect estimation of our specification, we will also address in part the 
issue of endogenous location choice in small (or large) neighborhoods. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
4.1  The case of New Zealand 
  Common to other Western nations, New Zealand has experienced a marked increase in 
social diversity over the past 25 years.  Starting as a British colony in the mid-nineteenth 
century, New Zealand‟s population was predominantly of British ancestry, with a significant 
indigenous Maori population (Phillips, 2008).  Immigration from other European and 
Commonwealth countries increased from the time of the second World War, and from 
neighboring Pacific Island and South East Asian nations.  Changes to the Immigration Act of 
1987, and the introduction of an ethnicity-blind points system in 1991 was followed by a 
substantial further diversification of migrants from China, India, and North African and 
Middle Eastern countries (Phillips, 2008).  For more detail about social diversity and 
volunteering in New Zealand, we turn to the data.                               
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4.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data comes from the New Zealand census rounds of 1996, 2001 and 2006.   The 
New Zealand census collects data on an exhaustive list of individual and household 
characteristics including volunteering activities, ethnicity/race, languages spoken, birthplace 
and household income. These data are released by Statistics New Zealand at various levels of 
neighborhood aggregation, right down to the unusually small size of meshblock (≈ 100 
people) and area unit (≈ 2000 people).  Constant 2006-defined neighborhood geographic 
boundaries are used for all three rounds to ensure consistency.  Our sample is restricted to all 
those neighborhoods without missing or censored explanatory variables.
7  Over the three 
years of the census, our pooled sample is 3,504 area units and 49,600 meshblocks in New 
Zealand.  
A description of the dependent and explanatory variables used is provided in Appendix 
1, and corresponding descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix 2.  To provide the reader 
with a description of contemporary New Zealand, Figure 1 illustrates the volunteering rate 
and ethnic, language, birthplace and nominal household income shares for 1996, 2001 and 
2006.  These shares are population-weighted mean values, based on those meshblocks 
providing complete observations for our analysis, or our “common sample.”
8  Figure 1 
suggests that New Zealand is increasing in diversity along each dimension.  Moving from 
shares to fragmentation measures (the equivalent of one minus the Herfindahl Index of 
concentration), Table 1 provides key descriptive statistics.  The population-weighted average 
proportion of New Zealanders aged 15 or over who reported volunteering at least once 
                                                       
7    In general, we constructed share variables for each neighborhood so as to ensure they 
were weakly positive and summed to one.  In the case of gender, for example, we constructed 
“ShareFemale” by dividing the frequency of “Number Female” by (“Number 
Female”+”Number Male”).  This assumes that non respondents had the same gender 
composition as respondents.  See Appendix II for details of each variable‟s construction. 
 
8   Corresponding descriptive statistics using all meshblocks providing observations for a 
given variable (our “maximum sample”), are provided in Appendix 3. 
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outside the household in the previous four weeks was 18.3% in 1996, and then, using a 
slightly different definition, 15.6% in 2001 and 14.7% in 2006.
9  During this same period,  
 
{Figure 1 about here.} 
 
{Table 1 about here.} 
 
fragmentation by ethnicity/race, languages usually spoken, birthplace, and nominal household 
income increased. Regarding ethnicity/race, a fragmentation index could conceivably range 
between 0 and .8 for five categories.  The population-weighted mean fragmentation across all 
meshblocks rose from .347 in 1996, to .352 in 2001, to .378 in 2006.  A similar index for 
language fragmentation, which could range from 0 to .75 over four categories, rose from 
0.246 in 1996 to .254 in 2001 to .275 in 2006.  The index for birthplace fragmentation, which 
could range from 0 to .5 over two categories (inside or outside of New Zealand), rose 
from .293 in 1996 to .300 in 2001 to .329 in 2006.  Finally, the index for nominal household 
income fragmentation, which could range from 0 to .833 over six unadjusted nominal income 
bands, rose from .746, to .757, to .766.
10 
  Another way to illustrate potential correlation between volunteering and fragmentation is 
to graph 95% confidence intervals of the best fit polynomial relationship between each 
                                                       
9   For 1996 volunteering was defined as having “Attended Committee Meeting etc Unpaid 
for Group, Church or Marae.”  For 2001 and 2006 the definition was changed to be defined 
as any “Other Helping or Voluntary Work For or Through any Organisation, Group or 
Marae.”  For all three years our definition excludes those caring for a child or someone who 
was ill, elderly, or disabled outside the household.  See Appendix Table 1I for more detail.  
Because of the change in volunteering question, we have repeated all the analysis to follow 
using only 2001 and 2006 data.  The results concerning heterogeneity‟s effects are very 
similar to what we report here, with the exception that the evidence for income 
heterogeneity‟s (negative) effect is slightly greater, becoming significant even in fixed effects 
analysis.      
 
10  Because the six household income bands were not adjusted for inflation between each 
census, we can only measure how the dispersion of unadjusted nominal incomes across bands 
has changed over time, not real household incomes.                                
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meshblock‟s volunteering rate and each dimension of heterogeneity.  This is done in Figure 2 
using the pooled sample.    A clear negative relationship appears between volunteering and 
ethnic, language and birthplace fragmentation, while a more diffuse inverted U relationship 
appears for nominal income fragmentation.  The non-monotonic relationship between income 
fragmentation and volunteering might reflect that there exists a degree of inequality beyond 
which volunteering is depressed, or simply that a correlation does not exist. 
 
{Figure 2 about here.} 
 
Thus, consistent with the findings in the literature, the fall in volunteering rates in New 
Zealand coincided with increasing heterogeneity by several dimensions.  Nonetheless, many 
other changes were taking place in New Zealand over these years which could have 
influenced people‟s decision to volunteer (via their tastes or opportunity costs), or 
organizations‟ decisions to demand volunteers (via volunteers‟ non-wage costs and 
productivity (Handy and Srinivasan (2005))).  We construct measures for many of these 
confounding factors, which are described in Appendices 1 and 2, including real median 
household income, and the ethnicity, language, and birthplace shares that underlie our 
fragmentation measures.  Among these variables, the average real median household income 
across meshblocks rose from NZ$ 37,800 in 1996, to $39,000 in 2001, to $45,000 in 2006.  
The mean share of females remained steady at 51%, while the mean percentage whose 
highest education was a bachelor‟s or honour‟s degree rose from 8% to 10% to 12%.  At the 
same time, the mean percentage of those aged 15 or over not in the labor force fell from 34% 
to 33% to 31%.  The mean percentage claiming Christian religious affiliation also fell from 
67% to 62% to 56%, while the mean percentage claiming no religious affiliation rose from 
28% to 31% to 36%.   We will try to untangle the effects of these various changes on 
volunteering rates in the regression analysis that follows.  
Finally, returning to the issue of neighborhood boundary, Table 2 compares the mean 
and standard deviation of meshblock and area unit measures of fragmentation.
11  As predicted 
in Section 3, the means of all four types of heterogeneity appear greater over area units than 
over meshblocks.  In addition, the standard deviation of neighborhood heterogeneity is 
consistently lower at the area unit level than at the meshblock level for every measure.  This 
                                                       
11 The descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 2 use the common sample used for subsequent 
regression analysis.                                  
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suggests that our choice of neighborhood size may indeed affect the empirical relationship we 
estimate between social heterogeneity and volunteering. 
 
4.3.  Estimation strategy and results 
  In this section, we lay out and implement our strategy for estimating the cross-sectional 
and longitudinal empirical relationship between social heterogeneity and volunteering.  
Because we have a wide, shallow panel of many neighborhoods over just three census years, 
our pooled data contains substantial variation between neighborhoods at any point in time,  
 
{Table 2 about here.} 
 
but less variation within neighborhoods over time.  In line with the vast majority of studies in 
our literature review, we shall begin by using pooled cross section OLS as our baseline 
specification.  To address the problem of omitted variable bias that attends cross section 
analysis, and to test the robustness of our results, we shall then add two steps.  First, we will 
repeat the baseline cross sectional analysis using various additional groups of control 
variables.  Second, we will switch to fixed effects analysis to address omitted variable bias 
resulting from location choice under a Tiebout-style hypothesis.  Throughout this process, we 
shall provide (small) meshblock regressions that provide either an unbiased or lower-bound 
estimate of heterogeneity‟s total effect on volunteering.  We shall also provide larger area 
unit regressions for comparison, and finally hybrid regressions.  Hybrid regression 
coefficients may be thought of as decomposing the total effects of heterogeneity into within 
and between effects if volunteering is affected only by heterogeneity in ij x .  If volunteering is 
also affected by heterogeneity in  , ij x i i    , hybrid regressions may be thought of as providing 
an upper bound of heterogeneity‟s total effect, (assuming area units contain all relevant 
heterogeneity), given by the sum of within and between coefficients.  In such cases, the lower 
bound of total effects is given by the single heterogeneity coefficient in the meshblock 
regressions.   
  Beginning with our baseline cross sectional analysis, we run regressions of the form  
ijt ijt ijt y X u                                                                   (10) 
where  ijt y  is meshblock i ‟s volunteering rate in area unit j in year t.   ijt X  is a vector of 
neighborhood characteristics, year dummies, and social heterogeneity measures, while  ijt u  is                               
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a random error.  In each case, we regress volunteering rates on one type of heterogeneity at a 
time, along with its underlying level variables (e.g. ethnic shares for ethnic fragmentation, 
language shares for language fragmentation, median household income for income 
fragmentation, etc.).  To these we add the baseline covariates of share female, median age, 
population density, mean household size, share married, shares of families comprised of 
couples with children, and couples without, and year dummies.
12   
  Table 3 provides the results.  Column (1) shows our baseline estimate of meshblock 
ethnic heterogeneity‟s effect on meshblock volunteering rates with controls for (meshblock) 
ethnic affiliation shares and baseline covariates. The estimated coefficient on ethnic 
fragmentation (-.128) implies a relatively strong negative effect of this type of heterogeneity 
on volunteering.  In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in meshblock ethnic 
fragmentation is estimated to decrease the (meshblock) volunteering rate by 1.3 percentage  
 
{Table 3 about here.} 
 
points.  This effect is only moderately overstated when area units are used in place of 
meshblocks in column (2), where a 10 percent increase in area unit ethnic/racial 
fragmentation decreases the (area unit) volunteering rate by 1.4 percentage points.  Finally, 
from our hybrid specification in column (3), a 10 percentage point increase in heterogeneity 
within meshblocks decreases (meshblock) volunteering by 1.1 percentage points.  At the 
same time, a 10 percent increase in corresponding area unit heterogeneity decreases 
meshblock volunteering by .4 percentage points.  This indicates the existence of between 
effects and/or the effect of heterogeneity in other meshblocks  , ij x i i    .
13    
                                                       
12   We have also added ethnic share composition to the baseline covariates when examining 
the effects of birthplace or income fragmentation on volunteering.  This is because of the 
clear effect that Maori ethnic affiliation has on volunteering rates.  Ethnic shares remain 
omitted when examining the effects of language fragmentation, because ethnic and language 
shares are highly correlated. 
13  The 1.05 (≈ 1.1) within, and .40 between effects of heterogeneity can be related to the 1.28 
total effect as follows.  If we assume heterogeneity in other meshblocks has no effect, then on 
average a ten percentage point increase in ethnic fragmentation within meshblocks raises 
ethnic fragmentation between meshblocks in the associated area unit by 5.75 percentage                               
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  The estimated effects of language, birthplace and household income heterogeneity are 
similarly provided in columns (4) – (12) of Table 3.  Language and birthplace heterogeneity 
are again strongly negatively associated with volunteering rates under the baseline 
specification.  From column (4), language fragmentation‟s (lower bound of) total effect on 
volunteering is a 2.8 percentage point drop, though it appears as a 3.7 percentage point drop 
when larger area units are used.  Similarly, from column (7), birthplace fragmentation‟s 
(lower bound of) total effect on volunteering is a 1.1 percentage point drop, which appears as 
a .3 percentage point drop using area unit neighborhoods.  Finally, nominal household 
income band fragmentation‟s (lower bound) total effect on volunteering in column (10) is a 
slight .2 percentage point drop, which appears as a 1.1 percentage point drop using area units.  
Thus, our baseline cross section results might suggest that New Zealand‟s shifting 
immigration and tax policy has been responsible for a drop in New Zealander‟s tendency to 
contribute time towards public goods.  These initial results also suggest that using broader 
neighborhood boundaries can either inflate or attenuate heterogeneity‟s estimated effects by 
as much as five times.   
  While our meshblock estimates of the effects of each type of heterogeneity on 
volunteering are almost uniformly negative, this could simply reflect the omission of other 
influences on volunteering that are correlated with heterogeneity. Omitted factors could 
include variation in religious affiliation, neighborhood deprivation, labor force status, or 
education.  We have also yet to test whether one type of heterogeneity affects volunteering 
when other dimensions of heterogeneity (and their underlying share variables) are controlled 
for. Thus, in Table 4 we extend our cross sectional analysis to include groups of other 
confounding variables one at a time.
14  These groups are: 1) religious affiliation: Christian, 
other, and no religion affiliation rates, 2) neighborhood deprivation: home ownership rates, 
median number of bedrooms, crime rates, and percentage of individuals receiving single 
parent domestic benefits, 3) employment status: shares in full time work, part time work, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
points, or 
B
j ij xx  = ( , ) ( )
B
ij j ij cov x x var x = .575. The total effect is then 1.05 + .40(.575) – 
1.28.  If we assume heterogeneity in other meshblocks is relevant, 1.28 becomes the lower 
bound of total effects, including the effect of  , ij x i i    . 
14   High degrees of correlation between various covariates precluded us from including all 
clusters simultaneously. 
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unemployed, and not in the labor force, 4) education levels: the share of individuals lacking 
minimum high school qualifications and the share with bachelor‟s or (additional year) 
honour‟s degrees, and 5) including all heterogeneity measures simultaneously, together with 
their underlying share variables.   Note that care must be taken in evaluating the effects of 
each type of heterogeneity when all are included simultaneously in 5), because they (and their 
underlying share variables) may be highly correlated. 
  While many of our baseline and added covariates explain variation in volunteering 
rates,
15 we focus in Table 4 on showing the direct (remaining) effect of each type of 
heterogeneity on volunteering.  Column (1) of Table 4 shows the (lower bound of) total effect 
of meshblock ethnic heterogeneity on meshblock volunteering as each group of confounding 
variables is added to the baseline covariates of Table 3.  In each case, ethnic/racial 
heterogeneity retains a significant, negative effect on volunteering of roughly 1 percentage 
point.  Language heterogeneity similarly retains a robust and relatively strong negative effect 
as other covariates are included.  From column (4), a 10 percentage point increase in  
 
{Table 4 about here.} 
 
meshblock language fragmentation results in a roughly 2 to 2.5 percentage point drop in the 
volunteering rate. 
  Birthplace heterogeneity (column 7) similarly retains a negative effect as covariates are 
added, similar in magnitude to ethnic heterogeneity (1 percentage point), with the exception 
of the case where all types of heterogeneity and underlying share variables are entered 
simultaneously.   There a 10 percentage point increase in meshblock birthplace fragmentation 
raises volunteering by .2 percentage points.  Finally, nominal household income band 
                                                       
15   Those covariates consistently positively related to volunteering rates were share with 
Maori ethnic affiliation, Maori and Samoan language shares, median age, share married, 
share of families that had couple with kids, and less so families that had a couple without kids, 
share with Christian or other religious affiliation, share who owned own home, median 
number of bedrooms, share with bachelors or honours degrees, and share employed part time.  
Those covariates consistently negatively related to volunteering rates were share with Asian 
or MELAA ethnic affiliation, English or “other” language share, household size, population 
density, share with no religious affiliation, share of families that were single parent, and share 
employed full time.                                  
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heterogeneity is similar to birthplace heterogeneity in retaining a negative effect on 
volunteering as covariates are added, except when all types of heterogeneity are included.  
However, the magnitude of the effect of income fragmentation on volunteering is smaller 
than for other types of heterogeneity.  It ranges between lowering volunteering by .4 
percentage points, to raising it by .1 percentage point when all heterogeneity is considered 
simultaneously.  While it is interesting that birthplace and income heterogeneity no longer 
lower volunteering rates when all types of heterogeneity are controlled for, the correlation 
that exists between various types of fragmentation mean that these findings must be treated 
with caution. 
Taken together, the baseline and extended cross sectional evidence so far points strongly 
to a negative effect of ethnic/racial and language heterogeneity on volunteering, and possibly 
to a negative effect of birthplace and income heterogeneity as well.  Nevertheless, as with 
any cross section analysis, there may remain unobserved characteristics that are correlated 
with heterogeneity that are skewing its estimated effects.  Even with the inclusion of 
extensive covariates, omitted variable bias remains a strong possibility because of the 
Tiebout hypothesis that people will self-select to live in an area with others who share their 
preferences regarding the optimal trade-off between private consumption and public goods 
provision (Tiebout 1956). Specifically, if people who are less inclined to volunteer are 
attracted to live in urban centres, which tend to be more heterogeneous, then the cross 
sectional effects of heterogeneity on volunteering will be exaggerated.  We therefore move to 
fixed effects analysis in an attempt to better control for unobserved characteristics like 
people‟s attitude towards volunteering or towards heterogeneity.   
One problem with using fixed effects analysis here is that we are following 
neighborhoods rather than individuals over time, and the latter are free to change where they 
live.  Is there any reason to expect that unobserved characteristics like attitude to 
volunteering would remain constant over time for given neighborhoods, even as the 
individuals in them come and go?  Perhaps ironically, our defence of this proposition comes 
from the same Tiebout hypothesis that raises the problem of endogenous neighborhood 
choice in the first place.  For with freedom of movement, individuals who come to differ with 
the local prevailing preferences between private and public good provision may leave, and 
those who share those preferences may enter.  If the effects of heterogeneity found with fixed 
effects do not correspond with those found in cross section, this might suggest that the cross 
section effects are spuriously caused by omitted variable bias.                                  
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To proceed, we estimate the following volunteering equation using panel data on the 
meshblocks of New Zealand:  
. ijt ijt ij ijt yX                                                                   (11) 
ijt y is the volunteering rate in meshblock i within area unit j in year t, while ijt X contains our 
set of heterogeneity measures and other control variables previously defined. The ij  are 
unobservable meshblock-specific fixed effects which may be correlated with  , ijt X while ijt  is 
a pure random error term.  To control for the potential correlation between ij   and , ijt X we 
apply OLS to the mean-differenced equation 
( ) . ijt ij ijt ij ijt ij y y X X                                                                         (12) 




  Table 5 presents the results.  The control variables included are identical to those used in 
baseline cross section (Table 3), and the effects are again presented using meshblock, area 
unit, and hybrid specifications.  In general, evidence of an effect of heterogeneity on 
volunteering has weakened.  As shown in column (1), ethnic fragmentation retains its 
negative effect on volunteering, but the magnitude of the (lower bound of) total effect has 
fallen from 1.1 percentage points in cross section to .5 percentage points under fixed effects.  
This suggests that neighborhoods that experience an increase in ethnic heterogeneity also 
experience a decrease in volunteering rates on average, but the effect is modest after 
controlling for people‟s choice of neighborhood location in the manner of the Tiebout 
hypothesis.  In contrast, language fragmentation has lost any significant effect (column (4)).  
Birthplace fragmentation in  
{Table 5 about here.} 
column (7) retains a negative but reduced effect, with a (lower bound of) total effect falling 
from 1.1 to .3 percentage points.   Finally, nominal household income fragmentation in 
                                                       
16   We consider also the more general case that endogenous location choice may occur even 
for large neighborhoods by adding an  j   term in equation (11), or an unobservable area unit-
specific fixed effect which may be correlated with  jt X .  The fixed effects of our hybrid 
specification will then control for both  ij   and  j  .                               
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column (10) is similar to language fragmentation in losing a significant effect.
17  All of these 
findings are qualitatively summarized in Table 6.  
  Methodologically, it is interesting to note that the choice of a larger neighborhood 
boundary would have substantially affected our (baseline) fixed effects results, just as it did 
our (baseline) cross section analysis.  If we use area units rather than meshblocks, ethnic 
fragmentation would inflate to a -1.1 rather than -.5 percentage point effect.  Language 
fragmentation would inflate to a -2.1 percentage point effect from no effect.  Birthplace 
fragmentation would attenuate to have no effect, rather than a -.3 percentage point effect.  
Only household income fragmentation would have a similar result – no effect – under either 
neighborhood boundary. 
 
5.  Discussion and conclusions 
  This paper has attempted to make two contributions to the growing empirical literature in 
which researchers estimate the effects of concave neighborhood characteristics like 
heterogeneity on outcomes of interest, such as people‟s likelihood of volunteering.  With 
access to unusually fine geographical units, and a panel of those units, we have addressed the 
problems posed by 1) the researcher‟s choice of neighborhood boundary, and 2) the 
researchees‟ endogenous choice of neighborhood.  Regarding boundaries, we show that for 
concave neighborhood characteristics like heterogeneity, using the smallest possible 
boundary that includes all posited effects will provide an unbiased estimate of total effect.  
Using overly-large boundaries will incorrectly capture the effect of differences in 
heterogeneity between constituent small neighborhoods on the outcome of   
 
{Table 6 about here.} 
interest.  This can bias estimates (up or down) of heterogeneity‟s total effect even when such 
“between heterogeneity” has zero economic effect.  Using overly-small boundaries will avoid 
this bias, but provide only a lower-bound estimate of heterogeneity‟s total effect by ignoring 
                                                       
17 This is the single case where restriction of the sample to the two years with an identical 
volunteering definition, 2001 and 2006, resulted in a different finding.  Here in fixed effects 
analysis, income fragmentation retains a negative effect of .2 percentage points, significant at 
the one percent level.                               
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the influence of heterogeneity in adjacent neighborhoods.  Hybrid approaches that use small 
and large boundaries simultaneously can also be used to distinguish the effect of 
heterogeneity within a small neighborhood, vs. the combined effects of heterogeneity in other 
small neighborhoods and of differences in heterogeneity between them. 
  Regarding endogenous neighborhood choice, we use a Tiebout-style argument to identify 
a likely problem: people who are less inclined to volunteer may be attracted to locate in 
(often more heterogeneous) urban centres with others who make similar tradeoffs between 
private consumption and volunteering.  The existing literature‟s estimated cross sectional 
effects of heterogeneity on volunteering may thus be exaggerated.  We next use the Tiebout 
hypothesis to identify a potential solution: while individuals may freely choose their small (or 
large) neighborhoods, the typical attitude towards volunteering in those neighborhoods may 
remain stable over time as like-minded people enter and contrary-minded people leave.  
Fixed effects analysis that follows neighborhoods over time may thus be able to control for 
unobserved but stable characteristics such as attitudes towards volunteering or heterogeneity.   
  We address both issues in practice by using a heretofore untapped source, New Zealand 
census data on volunteering over three rounds.  We test for a negative relationship between 
volunteering and heterogeneity by ethnicity/race, language, birthplace, and household income.  
The New Zealand census is unusual in releasing data in neighborhoods as small as 
meshblocks ( ≈ 100 people), and in asking New Zealanders whether they have volunteered in 
the four weeks prior to the census in 1996, 2001, and 2006.  It thus provides an unusual 
opportunity to carefully examine the effects of neighborhood size and endogenous sorting on 
estimates of the effect of heterogeneity on volunteering rates.   
  Our baseline cross sectional analysis suggests that diversity indeed discourages 
volunteering.  On average, a ten percentage point increase in ethnic fragmentation lowers the 
meshblock volunteering rate by at least 1.3 percentage points.  The corresponding lower 
bounds of negative effects for language, birthplace and household nominal income 
fragmentation are 2.8, 1.1 and .2 percentage points, respectively.  Estimated effects tend to be 
larger when larger area unit boundaries are used (1.4, 3.7, .3 and 1.1 percentage points, 
respectively).  This may be due to a combination of bias and correctly capturing 
heterogeneity influences external to the meshblock. 
  Recognizing that our baseline cross section regressions may be suffering from omitted 
variable bias, we repeat the analysis adding additional groups of covariates relating to 
religious affiliation, deprivation, employment, and education, as well as including the four                               
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types of heterogeneity simultaneously.  Extending our cross section covariates with one type 
of heterogeneity at a time does not greatly affect the magnitude of our negative findings.  On 
the other hand, including all types of heterogeneity and their underlying share variables 
simultaneously results in ethnic and language fragmentation retaining a negative effect, but 
birthplace and income fragmentation switching to a significant positive effect on volunteering. 
  Finally, since even expanded cross sectional analysis still omits unobserved variables 
that may be correlated to heterogeneity, we repeat our baseline cross sectional analysis using 
fixed effects that follow meshblocks (or larger area units) over time.  Here we find that the 
evidence of heterogeneity having a negative effect weakens.  Compared to analogous cross 
section regressions, the lower bound total effect of ethnic fragmentation, while still negative, 
falls from 1.3 to .5 percentage points.  The lower bound negative effect of language 
fragmentation disappears (from 2.8 to 0 percentage points).  The lower bound negative effect 
of birthplace fragmentation remains, but falls from 1.1 to .3 percentage points, while the 
lower bound negative effect of income fragmentation also disappears (from .2 to 0 percentage 
points).   Interestingly, a coarser level of neighborhood fixed effects analysis would suggest 
that ethnic and language fragmentation maintain the larger negative effects found in cross 
section (1.1 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively), but that birthplace fragmentation loses 
its effect.   
  Summarizing our findings, the lower bound of total effect of ethnic fragmentation on 
volunteering is found to be negative in baseline and extended cross section analysis, and 
weaker but still negative in fixed effects.  The lower bound of total effect of language 
fragmentation is strong and negative in baseline and extended cross section, but non-existent 
in fixed effects.  The lower bound of total effect of birthplace fragmentation is negative in 
baseline and extended cross section specifications, save where other types of heterogeneity 
are controlled, and weaker but still significantly negative in fixed effects.  Finally, the lower 
bound of total effect of nominal household income fragmentation is unstable, being relatively 
minor but negative in baseline and most extended cross section specifications, positive when 
other types of heterogeneity are controlled for, and non-existent in fixed effects.   
To the extent that fixed effects analysis does not find negative effects from language or 
income heterogeneity when cross section analysis does, it is unclear whether this is due to 
fixed effects‟ better ability to control for unobserved variables, or to its being subject to an 
errors-in-variable bias that lowers estimated effects towards zero because neighborhood self-
selection is not adequately controlled.   We are left with fairly conclusive evidence that                               
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heterogeneity by race/ethnicity depresses volunteering rates in New Zealand, suggestive 
evidence that heterogeneity by birthplace may do the same, and inconclusive evidence 
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Fig. 1: Population Weighted Mean Meshblock Ethnicity, Language, Birthplace and Nominal 
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Fig. 2: Best Fit Polynomial Relationship Between Meshblock Volunteering Rate and (a) 
Ethnic, (b) Language, (c) Birthplace and (d) Household Income Fragmentation. 
Pooled Sample (N = 49,600) 
                               
26 
 
Table 1:  
Population weighted means and standard deviations of key variables at the meshblock level, 
using a common sample. 
 
 
Census Year      Variable 
  Volunteering 
Rate 
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 (.136) 
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 (.126) 
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Table 2:  
Pooled population weighted means and standard deviations of heterogeneity variables at the 




  Variable 
  Ethnic/Racial 
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 .361          
 (.190) 
 .261          
 (.141) 
 .310         
 (.130) 





 .402   
 (.176) 
 .283  
 (.127) 
 .318            
(.120) 
 .797             
(.035) 
 




Determinants of volunteering rates: baseline cross section regression (pooled OLS, 
meshblock N = 49,600, area unit N = 3504). 
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(.018)*** 
  .345 
(.020)*** 
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European Ethnic Share  -.084 
(.017)*** 




     
English Language Share     
 






Maori Language Share     
 










  .076 
(.008)*** 




  .010 
(.007) 






Median Age    .000 
(.000)*** 




  .000 
(.000)*** 
















Marriage Share    .102 
(.003)*** 
  .024 
(.003)*** 
  .099 
(.003)*** 
  .106 
(.003)*** 
  .031 
(.003)*** 
  .101 
(.003)*** 
Share  of  Families  that 
are “Couple with Kids” 
  .037 
(.004)*** 
  .171 
(.005)*** 
  .037 
(.004)*** 
  .039 
(.004)*** 
  .221 
(.005)*** 
  .041 
(.004)*** 
Share  of  Families  
“Couple with No Kids” 
  .017 
(.003)*** 
  .116 
(.004)*** 
  .018 
(.003)*** 
  .027 
(.003)*** 
  .168 
(.003)*** 
  .025 
(.003)*** 




















  .000 
 (.000)    
-.027 
(.001)*** 









(.000)    
-.031 
(.001)*** 
       R 
2   .266  .593  .269  .262  .612  .263 
 
Note: 
***,**, * represent the levels of statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  Run on 
Stata 9.2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.                               
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Table 3 (Cont’d): 
Determinants of volunteering rates: baseline cross section regression (pooled OLS, 
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Born in NZ Share  -.031 
(.007)*** 




     






Asian Ethnic Share  -.013 
(.016) 




  .024 
(.017) 
  .236 
(.018)*** 
  .023 
(.016) 
Pacific Ethnic Share  .039 
(.016)** 
  .268 
(.017)*** 
  .041 
(.016)** 
  .073 
(.016)*** 
  .309 
(.017)*** 
  .073 
(.016)*** 
Maori Ethnic Share    .181 
(.017)*** 
  .428 
(.017)*** 
  .169 
(.016)*** 
  .266 
(.016)*** 
  .523 
(.017)*** 
  .262 
(.016)*** 
European Ethnic Share    .051 
(.016)*** 
  .227 
(.017)*** 
  .047 
(.016)*** 
  .123 
(.016)*** 
  .306 
(.017)*** 
  .121 
(.016)*** 








  .049 
(.011)*** 
-.004 
(.007)    
Median Age    .001 
(.000)*** 
  .001 
(.000)*** 
  .001 
(.000)*** 
  .000 
(.000)*** 
  .001 
(.000)*** 
  .001 
(.000)*** 











(.001)    
Marriage Share    .106 
(.003)*** 
  .025 
(.004)*** 
  .100 
(.003)*** 
  .118 
(.003)*** 
  .017 
(.004)*** 
  .119 
(.003)*** 
Share  of  Families  that 
are “Couple with Kids” 
  .043 
(.004)*** 
  .233 
(.006)*** 
  .047 
(.004)*** 
  .049 
(.004)*** 
  .377 
(.007)*** 
  .050 
(.004)*** 
Share  of  Families  
“Couple with No Kids” 
  .028 
(.004)*** 
  .180 
(.004)*** 
  .028 
(.003)*** 
  .031 
(.004)*** 
  .260 
(.004)*** 
  .032 
(.004)*** 












Year 2001  -.025 
(.001)*** 










Year 2006  -.029 
(.001)*** 










       R 
2   .251    .560    .256    .242     .580    .243 
 
Note: 
***,**, * represent the levels of statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  Run on 
Stata 9.2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Adding covariates as a robustness check on the effect of heterogeneity on volunteering rates  
(pooled OLS, meshblock N = 49,600, area unit N = 3504) 
 
Specification 
































   
-.234 
(.015)*** 
Basic (Same as Table 3) 
Area Unit 








Basic + Religious 
Affiliation (ChrSh, 
OthSh)  Meshblock 
-.109 
(.004)*** 




  -.201 
(.016)*** 
Basic + Religious 
Affiliation (ChrSh, 
OthSh)  Area Unit 








Basic + Deprivation 
(OwnHmSh, MedBedrm, 
Crime)
a  Meshblock 
-.126 
(.004)*** 




  -.231 
(.017)*** 
Basic + Deprivation 
(OwnHmSh, MedBedrm, 
Crime)
a  Area Unit 








Basic + Employment 
(UnempSh, EmpFTSh, 
NotLFSh)  Meshblock 
-.119 
(.004)*** 




  -.241 
(.016)*** 
Basic + Employment 
(UnempSh, EmpFTSh, 
NotLFSh)  Area Unit 








Basic + Education Levels 








  -.322 
(.015)*** 
Basic + Education Levels 
(NoQualSh, BHSh)  
Area Unit 








Basic + All Fragment 








  -.163 
(.026)*** 
Basic + All Fragment 
+ Underlying Shares 
Area Unit 




  -.181 
(.022)*** 
  .123 
(.010)*** 
Note: 
***,**,  *  represent  the  levels  of  statistical  significance  of  1%,  5%,  and  10%  respectively.      
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
a  Obs.=37942 Meshblocks and 2382 Area Units, as the Crime variable is available only for 2001 and 
2006.  
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Table 4 (Cont’d): 
Adding covariates as a robustness check on the effect of heterogeneity on volunteering rates  
(pooled OLS, meshblock N = 49,600, area unit N = 3504) 
 
Specification 
































   
-.003 
(.005) 
Basic (Same as Table 3) 
Area Unit 








Basic + Religious 
Affiliation (ChrSh, 
OthSh)  Meshblock 
-.091 
(.006)*** 




    .003 
(.005) 
Basic + Religious 
Affiliation (ChrSh, 
OthSh)  Area Unit 








Basic + Deprivation 
(OwnHmSh, MedBedrm, 
Crime)
a  Meshblock 
-.097 
(.006)*** 




  -.024 
(.006)*** 
Basic + Deprivation 
(OwnHmSh, MedBedrm, 
Crime)
a  Area Unit 








Basic + Employment 
(UnempSh, EmpFTSh, 
NotLFSh)  Meshblock 
-.098 
(.006)*** 




    .002 
(.005) 
Basic + Employment 
(UnempSh, EmpFTSh, 
NotLFSh)  Area Unit 








Basic + Education Levels 








  -.009 
(.005)* 
Basic + Education Levels 
(NoQualSh, BHSh)  
Area Unit 








Basic + All Fragment 
+ Underlying Shares 
Meshblock 
  .023 
(.008)*** 
    .045 
(.008)*** 
  .008 
(.004)* 
    .016 
(.005)*** 
Basic + All Fragment 
+ Underlying Shares 
Area Unit 









***,**,  *  represent  the  levels  of  statistical  significance  of  1%,  5%,  and  10%  respectively.      
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
a  Obs.=37942 Meshblocks and 2382 Area Units, as the Crime variable is available only for 2001 and 




Fixed effects baseline estimation of effects of fragmentation on volunteering rates 





























  -.044 
(.009)*** 
  .019 
(.021) 


























HH  Income 
Fragment 
Meshblock 




























***,**, * represent the levels of statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.                                
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Table 6:  
Summary regarding the (lower bound of) total effects of heterogeneity on volunteering rates  
 
 






1  Fragmentation 







Ethnic/Racial   -  -  -  - 
Language 
-  -  -  0 
Birthplace 
-  -  +  - 
Nominal  HH 
Income 
-  -  +  0
a 
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Not for Publication  
Appendix 1: Description of Variables 
   
 
Variable                             Description      
 
Volunteering   
 
  Volunteering       2006, 2001 Proportion of meshblock reporting “Other    
            Helping or Voluntary Work For or Through any     
    VolNarr06       Organisation, Group or Marae” in the previous four weeks. 
    VolNarr01       Excludes following unpaid activities outside the household:    
    VolNarrAAlt96     caring for a child or someone who is ill, elderly, or      
            disabled. 
 
              Construction:  “Other Helping….”/(Total – Not Stated) 
              Assumes:  “Not Stated” identical in likelihood of    
              volunteering as those who state. 
 
            1996 Proportion of meshblock reporting “Attended      
            Committee Meeting etc Unpaid for Group, Church or    
            Marae” in the previous four weeks.   
 
            Construction:  “Attended…”/(Total – Not Specified) 
            Assumes:  “Not Specified” identical in likelihood of     
            volunteering as those who state.  Excludes the non mutually  
            exclusive categories of  “Did Unpaid Training, Coaching,   
            Teaching etc.” and “Did Fundraising, Selling etc Unpaid    
            for Group, Church or Marae” and “Did Other Unpaid    
            Work”.  This was because the latter categories had massive  
            censoring, and had such overlap with the included category  
            that retaining them would have resulted in implausibly high  






  Ethnic/Racial       2006,2001,1996.  A fragmentation index for each      
  Fragmentation       meshblock, where the five possible ethnic shares si are    
            “European”, “Maori”, “Pacific Peoples”, “Asian”, and    
    EthFrag06        “Middle Eastern/Latin American/African”.  Individuals   
    EthFrag01        could select more than one ethnicity, so the ethnic share is     
    EthFrag96        calculated from a baseline of total ethnic affiliations rather  
            than total people. 
 








   See construction of ethnic shares 
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Appendix 1 (Cont’d): Description of Variables 
   
 
Variable                              Description      
 
 
Heterogeneity Measures (Cont’d) 
 
  Language        2006, 2001, 1996.  A fragmentation index for each     
  Fragmentation      meshblock, where the four possible language shares si are   
            “English”, “Maori”, “Samoan” and “Other”.   Individuals     
    LanFrag06      could select more than one language spoken, so the    
    LanFrag01      language share is calculated from a baseline of total         
    LanFrag96      language responses rather than total people.  
 








  See construction of language shares. 
 
  Birthplace        2006, 2001, 1996. A fragmentation index for each      
  Fragmentation      meshblock‟s usually resident population, where the two possible 
            shares si of each meshblock are “Born in New Zealand” and “Born 
    BornFrag06      Overseas”.   
    BornFrag01   








  See construction of birthplace shares. 
 
 
   
  Household Income    2006, 2001, 1996.  A fragmentation index constructed over     
  Fragmentation      the  shares si of a neighborhood‟s households with income from  
            all sources in one of six nominal income bands.  The bands are not  
    HHIncFrag06      adjusted for inflation, and are $0-$20,000; $20,001 - $30,000;   
    HHIncFrag01      $30,001 - $50,000; $50,001 - $70,000; $70,000 - $100,000;      
    HHIncFrag96      $100,001 and greater.   
             








  Shares constructed  from  the  frequency of 
            households  reporting  total  income  within  a  band,  divided  by  all 
            households for whom total income was available.                               
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Appendix 1 (Cont’d): Description of Variables 
   
 
Variable                             Description      
   
Control Variables 
 
  Ethnic Shares      2006,2001,1996.  The proportion of meshblock usual      
                 residents reporting one of five ethnic identifications:     
     EthEurSh06,01,96   European, Maori, Pacific, Asian, and Middle Eastern/Latin     
     EthMaoSh06,01,96    American/African.  Individuals could select more than one      
     EthPacSh06,01,96   ethnicity, so each ethnic share is calculated from a base of   
     EthAsnSh06,01,96   the total ethnic affiliations across these five categories         
     EthMELAA06,01,96  rather than total people.  
            
            Construction: frequencies were summed across the five    
            categories to create a base of total ethnic affiliations from which 
            shares were calculated.  For 1996 and 2001, the very small  
            fraction of individuals with “other” ethnicities, such as North  
            American Inuit or Indian, Mauritian, etc. are excluded from the 
            baseline.  Statistics NZ assigned the small fraction answering  
            “New Zealander” in 1996 and 2001 as European.  For 2006, a  
            much larger proportion of respondents replied “New Zealander”, 
            and  though 90% of these are thought to be European, they were 
            classified by Statistics NZ under “other.”  Because “New  
            Zealander” responses made up over 99% of “other” in 2006, 
            we assigned the “other” category as European for that year.     
   
    
  Language Shares    2006, 2001, 1996.  The proportion of meshblock usual    
            residents indicating they spoke one of four language 
    EngLanSh06,01,96   classifications: English, Maori, Samoan and Other.  
    MaoLanSh06,01,96   Individuals could select more than one language (or none),     
    SamLanSh06,01,96   so the language share is calculated from a baseline of total  
    OthLanSh06,01,96   languages spoken rather than total people.   
     
            Construction:  frequencies were summed across the four language 
            categories, omitting “None” or “Not Elsewhere Included”, to  
            create a base of total  meshblock languages  spoken from  which 
            shares were calculated. 
 
 
  Birthplace Shares    2006, 2001, 1996.  The proportion of meshblock usual    
            residents born in New Zealand vs. born overseas. 
    NZBornSh06 
    NZBornSh01      Construction:  frequences were summied across the two birthplace  
    NZBornSh96      categories, excluding those “Not Elsewhere Specified”.  Assumed:  
            that those who did not answer this question were as likely to be 
            born overseas as those who did answer.                               
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Appendix 1 (Cont’d): Description of Variables 
   
 
Variable                              Description      
   
Control Variables (Cont’d) 
   
  Real Median       2006, 2001, 1996.  The median household income from all     
  Household Income    sources for usual residents of meshblock aged 15 or older. 
              Provided by Statistics New Zealand.  Deflated by GDP  
    RHHIncMed06     deflator (1995 = 1000) of 1996 (1016.00), 2001 (1103.50)    
    RHHIncMed01     and 2006 (1224.50). 
    RHHIncMed96 
 
 
  Female         2006, 2001, 1996.  The proportion of a meshblock‟s usually  
            resident population that is female. 
    FemaleSh06 
    FemaleSh01      Construction:  frequencies were summed across the two 
    FemaleSh96      categories of “Male” and “Female” to create a base from    
            which shares were calculated.  Assumes:  sex frequencies   
            are more reliable than the “totals” with rounding provided  
            by Stats NZ.  
 
   
  Number of Residents  2006, 2001, 1996.  Size of meshblock in terms of usually   
            resident population.  Only needed if we try weighted least 
    UsRes06,01,96     squares to weight meshblock observations by population    
            size. 
 
 
  Population Density    2006 only.  Census meshblock usually resident population  
            divided by meshblock square kilometers.     
    PopDens06       
 
         
  Median Age       2006, 2001, 1996.  Median age of meshblock usually     
            resident population.   
    AgeMed06,01,96 
 
 
 Marital Status      2006, 2001, 1996. The share of each meshblock‟s usually   
            resident population 15 and over who were currently  
    MarrSh06       married, as opposed to 1) never married or 2) separated/  
    MarrSh01       divorced/widowed or 3) who did not answer the question. 
    MarrSh96 
            Construction:  the four categories were summed to      
            calculate the base.  This assumes that all non-responders    
            are not married                               
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Appendix 1 (Cont’d): Description of Variables 
   
 
Variable                              Description      
   
Control Variables (Cont’d) 
 
  Crime          2006, 2001.  The number of recorded offences per capita   
            for each of the 43 Police Areas in New Zealand. 
    Crime06 
    Crime01        Construction:  Statistics New Zealand map all meshblocks  
            into one of 43 Police Areas for which per capita offences   
            data is released. 
 
  Family Type      2006, 2001, 1996.  The share of meshblock families in     
                 private dwellings of three possible types: couples without    
    CoupNKSh06,01,96  children, couples with children, and single parent families. 
    CoupKSh06,01,96 
    SinParSh06,01,96    Construction:  frequencies were summed across the three  
                possible categories to provide a baseline. 
 
 
  Religious Affiliation   2006, 2001, 1996.  The share of each meshblock‟s usually  
            resident population identifying with one of three categories:    
    ChrSh06,01,96     Christian, No Religion and Other Religion.  For 2001 and  
    NoRel06,01,96     2006 individuals could identify with more than one         
    OthRSh06,01,96    religion, so that the base is calculated from total religious   
            affiliations, rather than total people. 
   
              Construction: Other Religion summed frequencies across   
            Buddhist, Hindu, Islam/Muslim, Judaism, Maori Christian,  
            Spiritualist/New Age and Other Religions.  “Not Elsewhere  
            Included” are excluded from the base, which assumes that  
            non-responders are similar to responders. 
 
  Education High     2006, 2001, 1996.  The share of each meshblock‟s usually  
            resident population 15 or over whose highest degree is a  
    BHSh06        bachelor‟s or honours degree. 
    BHSh01 
    BHSh96        Construction: summed frequencies of “Bachelor‟s Degree  
            or Level 7 Qualification” and “Postgraduate and Honours   
            Degrees” (which excludes masters and PhD degrees), and    
            divided by total people.  This assumes that all “Not Elsewhere  
            Included” individuals do not have a bachelor‟s or honour‟s 
            degree.                               
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Appendix 1 (Cont’d): Description of Variables 
   
 
Variable                             Description      
   
Control Variables (Cont’d) 
 
  Education Low      2006, 2001, 1996.  The share of each meshblock‟s usually  
            resident population 15 or over who left high school without  
    NoQualSh06      any (even minimum) qualification. 
    NoQualSh01 
    NoQualSh96      Construction: “No Qualification” divided by total people.   
            This assumes that all “Not Elsewhere Included” individuals  
            had one of the other eight sub-university or four university  
            level degrees. 
 
   
  Mean Household Size  2006, 2001, 1996.  The average number of usually resident  
            people per household in the meshblock.  Used as a proxy     
    HHSize06       for household crowding and neighborhood deprivation. 
    HHSize01 
    HHSize96       Construction:  provided directly from Statistics New     
            Zealand to zero decimal places. 
 
 
  Labor Force Status    2006, 2001, 1996.  The share of the usually resident      
            population in each meshblock aged 15 or over in one of 
    EmpFTSh06,01,96    four possible categories of labor force status: employed      
    EmpPTSh06,01,96    full time, employed part-time, unemployed, or not in labor     
    UnempSh06,01,96    force. 
    NotLFSh06,01,96 
                Construction:  frequencies for four categories summed to  
                   provide a baseline from which shares calculated.  “Status   
            Unidentifiable” were excluded, which assumes that those   
            who did not disclose their labor force status were similar    
            to those who did. 
 
  
  Number of Bedrooms  2006, 2001, 1996.  Median number of bedrooms in      
            privately occupied dwellings in meshblock.  Another proxy  
    MedBedrms06     for neighborhood deprivation. 
    MedBedrms01 
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Appendix A (Cont’d): Description of Variables 
   
 
Variable                             Description      
   
Control Variables (Cont’d) 
 
  Home Ownership Status  2001, 1996.  The share of dwellings owned or partially owned  
            by their usual residents.   Excludes from consideration residents         
    OwnHmSh01      who owned or partially owned  their own homes via family trusts. 
    OwnHmSh96 
            Construction:  frequencies for dwellings 1) owned/partially  
            owned by residents, and 2) not owned by residents summed  
            to provide a base from which the share of owner occupied  
            dwellings calculated.  Excludes “Dwellings Held in a      
            Family Trust” and “Not Elsewhere Included” 
 
 
  Home Ownership Status  2006 only.  The share of dwellings owned or partially owned  
            by their usual residents, or held in a family trust.  Dwellings held 
    AltOwnHmSh06    in a family trust are treated as owned/partially owned.  
 
            Construction: frequencies for dwellings 1) owned/partially  
            owned by residents, 2) not owned by residents and 3) held  
            in family trusts, summed to provide a base from which the  
            share of owner/trust occupied dwellings calculated.  Excludes  
            “Not Elsewhere Included”, which assumes non responders are  
            similar in distribution to responders. 
 
 
  Receiving Domestic   2006, 2001, 1996.  Share of meshblock individuals aged 15  
  Purposes Benefit    or over receiving the Domestic Purposes Benefit (a welfare  
            programme for single parents).  Another proxy for neighborhood  
    DomBenSh06      deprivation. 
    DomBenSh01 
    DomBenSh96      Construction: frequency of individuals 15 or over receiving  
            income from the domestic purposes benefit in meshblock   
            divided by the total number of people who disclosed their   
            sources of income.  This assumes that the distribution of    
            Benefit recipients similar among those who did and did not  
            disclose their sources of personal income.                                           
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics (At Meshblock Level, Maximum Sample)   
     
 
            Simple  Weighted  Simple 





VolNarrAAlt96        16712  .1943  .1889       .0702       .0195          .75 
VolNarr01       32888  .1682  .1625    .0796    0          1 




Ethnicity/Race Fragmentation (5 categories) 
 
EthFrag96         34563  .2955  .3179    .1877            0         .7778 
EthFrag01         35150  .3115      .3367    .1932            0         .7951 
EthFrag06         34089  .3393      .3629    .1916            0         .7937 
 
Language Fragmentation (4 categories) 
 
LanFrag96        34791  .2044  .2213    .1414    0      .685 
LanFrag01        35323  .2209  .2406    .1449    0      .72 
LanFrag06        35975  .2353  .2587    .1467    0      .6837 
 
Birthplace Fragmentation (2 categories) 
 
BornFrag96       36533  .2389  .2634    .1424    0      .5 
BornFrag01       37057  .2509  .2797    .1463    0      .5 
BornFrag06       37637     .2754  .3089    .1474    0      .5 
 
Household Income Fragmentation (6 categories) 
 
HHIncFrag96        25582  .7346  .7421    .0809    0      .8333 
HHIncFrag01        26534  .7478  .7556    .0744    0      .8333 








EthEurSh96        34563  .7803  .7643    .1976    0      1 
EthEurSh01        35150  .7615      .7423    .2108            0      1 
EthEurSh06        34089  .7362      .7148    .2180            0      1 
   
EthMaoSh96    34563  .1323      .1333    .1438            0      1 
EthMaoSh01        35150  .1327      .1313    .1466            0      1 
EthMaoSh06        34089  .1337      .1292    .1420            0      1 
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Appendix B (Cont’d): Descriptive Statistics (At Meshblock Level, Maximum Sample)   
     
            Simple  Weighted  Simple 
Variable     Obs   Mean  Mean    Std. Dev.  Min     Max 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Controls for Neighborhood Characteristics (Cont’d) 
 
Ethnic Shares (Cont’d) 
 
EthPacSh96        34563  .0438       .0521    .0992            0      1 
EthPacSh01        35150  .0489     .0583    .1105            0      1 
EthPacSh06    34089  .0533      .0622    .1140            0      1 
 
EthAsnSh96      34563  .0399      .0462    .0695            0      .8857      
EthAsnSh01     35150  .0517      .0619    .0865            0      1 
EthAsnSh06        34089  .0697      .0855     .1100            0      .925 
 
EthMELAASh96    34563  .0036      .0040    .0143            0      .8 
EthMELAASh01  35150  .0052      .0062    .0174            0      .52 





EngLanSh96        34791  .8772  .8675    .0976    .2857    1 
EngLanSh01        35323  .8658  .8537    .1016    .2222    1 
EngLanSh06        35975  .8549  .8393    .1055    .4      1 
 
MaoLanSh96        34791  .0387  .0385    .0595    0      .5714 
MaoLanSh01        35323  .0391  .0382    .0579    0      .5172 
MaoLanSh06        35975  .0369  .0347    .0571    0      .5 
 
SamLanSh96        34791  .0138  .0168    .0401    0      .5 
SamLanSh01        35323  .0147  .0179    .0406    0      .4444 
SamLanSh06        35975  .0143  .0174    .0395    0      .4444 
 
OthLanSh96        34791  .0703  .0772    .0690    0      .5714 
OthLanSh01        35323  .0803  .0903    .0769     0      .7778 
OthLanSh06        35975  .0939  .1086    .0866    0      .6 
 
 
Born in New Zealand Shares 
 
NZBornSh96    36533  .8402  .8243    .1218    0      1 
NZBornSh01        37057  .8260  .8050    .1353    0      1 
NZBornSh06        37637  .7998  .7703    .1498    0      1 
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Appendix B (Cont’d): Descriptive Statistics (At Meshblock Level, Maximum Sample)   
     
            Simple  Weighted  Simple 
Variable     Obs   Mean  Mean    Std. Dev.  Min     Max 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Controls for Neighborhood Characteristics (Cont’d) 
 
Real Median Household Meshblock Income (1995 New Zealand Dollars) 
 
RHHIncMed96      25587  37307  37768    14760.5    0               98425 
RHHIncMed01       26534  38767  39328    15965.8    7250             90621 





FemaleSh96     37103  .5015  .5088    .0781    0      1 
FemaleSh01          37544  .5051  .5123    .0770    0      1 
FemaleSh06        38090  .5052  .5121    .0741    0      1 
 
 
Population Density of Meshblock 2006 
 





AgeMed96    31903  33.65  33.44    8.0842    10      86 
AgeMed01        32471  35.42  35.16    8.3549    11      88 
AgeMed06        33210  36.60  36.22    8.7959    13      88 
 
 
Share Married (Of Age 15 or Older) 
 
MarrSh96         35542  .4936  .4858    .1649    0      1 
MarrSh01         36068  .4707  .4654    .1633    0      1 
MarrSh06         36812  .4513  .4879    .1627    0      1 
 
 
Per Capital Recorded Offences  
 
Crime01          41376  .1115  .1099        .0699    .0689    .7073 
Crime06          41376  .1009  .1012    .0436    .0641    .4178 
 
 
Family Type Shares 
 
CoupleNKSh96      32340  .3757  .3680    .1631    0      1 
CoupleNKSh01      32875  .3924  .3833    .1663    0      1 
CoupleNKSh06      33660  .4034  .3931    .1698    0      1 
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Appendix B (Cont’d): Descriptive Statistics (At Meshblock Level, Maximum Sample)   
     
            Simple  Weighted  Simple 
Variable     Obs   Mean  Mean    Std. Dev.  Min     Max 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Controls for Neighborhood Characteristics (Cont’d) 
 
Family Type Shares (Cont’d) 
 
CoupleKSh96        32340  .4507  .4505    .1586    0      1 
CoupleKSh01        32875  .4202  .4225    .1552    0      1 
CoupleKSh06        33660  .4157  .4204    .1542    0      1 
 
SingleParSh96       32340  .1736  .1815    .1433    0      1 
SingleParSh01       32875  .1874  .1942    .1440    0      1 
SingleParSh06       33660  .1808  .1865    .1423     0      1 
 
 
Religious Affiliation Shares    
 
ChrisSh96         33546  .6826  .6794    .1243    0      1 
ChrisSh01         34123  .6251  .6215    .1278    0      1 
ChrisSh06         34763  .5664  .5634    .1304    0      1 
 
NoRelSh96        33546  .2760  .2761    .1139    0      1 
NoRelSh01        34123  .3150  .3140    .1177    0      1 
NoRelSh06        34763  .3651  .3613    .1262    0      1 
 
OthRSh96         33546  .0415  .0445    .0630    0      .9565 
OthRSh01         34123  .0599  .0644    .0752    0      1 
OthRSh06        34763  .0685  .0753    .0842    0      .9583 
 
 
Education Shares High or Low     
 
Bach/HonsSh96  31128  .0777  .0784    .0861    0      .7778 
Bach/HonsSh01  31824  .0974  .0990    .0967    0      .75 
Bach/HonsSh06  31646  .1134  .1162    .0913    0      .7 
 
NoQualSh96        31128  .3301  .3265    .1384    0      .9512 
NoQualSh01        31824  .2455  .2405    .1158    0      .96 
NoQualSh06        31646  .2335  .2264    .1157    0      .8313 
  
 
Average Household Size 
 
HHSize96         27936  3.0056  2.8102    2.4534    1      35 
HHSize01         28824  2.9295  2.7418    2.4105    1      37 
HHSize06         29807  2.9289  2.7613    2.3576    1      39 
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Appendix B (Cont’d): Descriptive Statistics (At Meshblock Level, Maximum Sample)   
     
            Simple  Weighted  Simple 
Variable     Obs   Mean  Mean    Std. Dev.  Min     Max 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Controls for Neighborhood Characteristics (Cont’d) 
 
Labor Market Shares  
 
EmplFTSh96        34989  .4741  .4640    .14007    0      1 
EmplFTSh01        35559  .4847  .4747    .13909    0      1 
EmplFTSh06        36263  .5113  .5023    .13149    0      1 
 
EmplPTSh96        34989  .1419  .1398    .0671    0      1 
EmplPTSh01        35559  .1444  .1424    .0652    0      .6667 
EmplPTSh06        36263  .1504  .1486    .0652    0      1 
 
UnempSh96       34989  .0498  .0521    .0520    0      .5 
UnempSh01        35559  .0492  .0513    .0504    0      .5 
UnempSh06        36263  .0339  .0357    .0403    0      1 
 
NotLFSh96        34989  .3342  .3441    .1414    0      1 
NotLFSh01        35559  .3218  .3315    .1370    0      1 
NotLFSh06        36263  .3044  .3134    .1304    0      1 
 
 
Median Number of Bedrooms 
 
MedBedrms96       26867  2.9106  2.913    .4489    0      6 
MedBedrms01       27868  2.9693  2.974    .4742    1      6 
MedBedrms06       28885  3.0010  3.010    .5031    1      6 
 
 
Share Owning or Partially Owning Own Home  
 
OwnHmSh96        33809  .7002  .7049    .2100    0      1 
OwnHmSh01        34511  .6796  .6754    .2025    0      1 
AltOwnHmSh06     34106  .6619  .6624    .2046    0      1 
 
 
Share Receiving Domestic Purposes Benefit   
 
DomBenSh96        29504  .0416  .0427    .0472    0     .4545 
DomBenSh01        30153  .0414  .0423    .0453    0     .4286 
DomBenSh06        31110  .0339  .0342    .0407    0     .4444                               
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Appendix C: Population Weighted Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables Over Time 






            1996 
Mean           N 
(St. Dev) 
 
        2001 
Mean           N      
(St. Dev) 
        2006 




Meshblock    .189         16712 
 (.066) 
  .163        32888 
 (.069) 
 .154          34710 
(.068) 
 
Area Unit    .193          1757 
 (.044) 
  .163          1779 
 (.042) 




Meshblock   .318         34563 
 (.184) 
 .337         35150 
 (.190) 
 .363          34089 
(.190) 
 
Area Unit   .342           1786 
 (.161) 
 .362           1781 
 (.170) 




Meshblock   .221          34791 
 (.137) 
  .241        35323 
 (.140) 
 .259          35975 
(.143) 
 
Area Unit   .231            1791 
 (.114) 
 .250           1784 
 (.120) 




Meshblock   .263         36533 
 (.130)  
 .280         37057 
 (.134)  
 .309          37637 
(.132) 
 
Area Unit   .271           1806 
 (.112)  
 .289           1798 
 (.118) 





Meshblock   .742         25582 
 (.075) 
 .756         26534 
 (.069) 
 .765         27576 
(.067) 
 
Area Unit   .782          1748 
 (.039) 
 .796          1755 
 (.033)  
 .805           1753 
(.033) 
  
 